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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will first of all look back and to take stock of the work I have 
accomplished in correlating Bonhoeffer’s theology with environmental ethics. I undertake 
this task in 7.1, where I set out to answer the central research question. Secondly, in 7.2, I 
shall overview the results that this dissertation has arrived at, indicating the relevance of this 
research for ongoing theological reflection on ecology. Thirdly, in 7.3, I will close with a 
description of the possibilities for future research on the dissertation’s topic.  
 
7.1 Taking Stock of the Results Achieved 
 
In Chapter 1, I began by formulating the following research question: “In which way can a 
number of concepts from the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer be transposed and made 
relevant for contemporary discussions in the field of environmental ethics?” In response to 
this question, I examined a great number of concepts from Bonhoeffer’s theology, bringing 
them into dialogue with current discussions in environmental ethics––this is the work that 
was carried out in chapters 2 through 6.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 explored concepts from Bonhoeffer’s theology that could be situated 
under the general heading of the relationship between God (or more specifically, Christ) and 
nature. In Chapter 2, I started off by treating four such concepts that deal with the relationship 
between Christ and the world in general (that is, not directly in reference to nature as such). 
The most prominent of these was Bonhoeffer’s concept of Christuswirklichkeit, which, as we 
saw, gave shape to his proposal for overcoming certain false distinctions that precluded 
Christians from engaging with the whole of reality. As I made clear, Bonhoeffer bases his 
appeal on his assertion that, by entering the world, Christ directed all reality to himself, 
thereby overcoming the distinction between a ‘worldly’ and a ‘spiritual’ realm––in other 
words, for Bonhoeffer, reality is, in Christ, fundamentally undivided. At the same time, I also 
showed how Bonhoeffer acknowledges the existence of certain relative distinctions within 
reality, which guard his ontology from collapsing into a Christological monism. As I argued, 
Bonhoeffer’s assertion that the world as a whole is directed towards Christ bestows an 
eschatological dimension on his understanding of Christuswirklichkeit. In this connection, we 
discovered a number of parallels between his concept and contemporary research in New 
Testament theology, which stresses that the eschaton was inaugurated by Christ’s advent in 
the world. I then correlated Bonhoeffer’s concept of Christuswirklichkeit with the 
contemporary question of how to motivate Christians to take ecological action, especially in 
light of certain ‘escapist’ tendencies at work in evangelical eschatology. In contrast to these 
tendencies, I presented Bonhoeffer’s concept as a compelling alternative to a world-denying 
eschatology.  
 
The second set of concepts that I explored in Chapter 2 was that of the ultimate and 
the penultimate, which can be seen as one of the relative distinctions that Bonhoeffer 
articulates within the one, undivided Christuswirklichkeit. In understanding the ultimate in 
terms of justification by grace, we saw how Bonhoeffer dismissed both radicalism and 
compromise as false solutions for dealing with the divide between the ultimate and the 
present, fallen reality of the world. According to him, this tension is resolved, not in the 
attitude that the church happens to adopt, but in the person of Jesus Christ. In concrete terms, 
he develops the notion of the penultimate as a sort of third possibility, or alternative, insisting 
that the latter aims at (or prepares the way for) the ultimate, even while, at the same time, 
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differing qualitatively from it. Just like with the concept of Christuswirklichkeit, I argued that 
the penultimate is defined in particular by an inherent eschatological dimension: it links up 
with the distinction in recent New Testament scholarship between the ‘already’ and the ‘not 
yet’ of Christ’s eschatological Kingdom. I then correlated Bonhoeffer’s pair of concepts with 
the connection between eschatology and ecotheology, drawing particular attention to certain 
trends in liberal eschatology. In particular, I used his thoughts on the penultimate in order to 
criticize the optimistic and immanent bearing of liberal conceptions of eschatology, arguing 
that his understanding of the merely preparatory nature of the penultimate can help relieve 
Christians of the (apparent) burden of having to realize God’s Kingdom themselves.  
 
Thirdly, I focussed on the further specification that Bonhoeffer gives to the 
relationship between Christ and the world through his discussion of the three moments of the 
incarnation, the crucifixion and the resurrection. As I noted, this differentiation results in a 
particularly nuanced approach to the world. In correlating the concept with environmental 
ethics, I showed how this threefold definition of the Christ-world relation can provide a 
grammar that is finely-tuned and articulate enough to speak of nature’s beauty and bounty 
without going so far as to underestimate (or conveniently ignore) the havoc and destruction 
that it causes. As such, I argued, the concept can help oppose those approaches to nature that 
adopt a dangerously myopic, or one-sided, point of view.  
 
The fourth and final concept that I treated in Chapter 2 was that of ‘das Natürliche’. 
As I showed, Bonhoeffer took a rather unique position relative to most other Protestant 
theologians by developing a robust appreciation of the concept of the natural, which was his 
way of taking the self-preserving process of life into account—that is, nature’s tendency to 
restore equilibrium. I then correlated this concept with the Gaia theory, which has grown to 
be so popular in ecological circles. In particular, I argued that Bonhoeffer’s concept of the 
natural can help provide an added theological weight to the concept: while it accepts the 
natural as a basic, biological category, it also resists the introduction of a pure and simple 
naturalism into the realm of Christian ethics.  
 
Whereas the concepts articulated in Chapter 2––especially that of 
Christuswirklichkeit––were foundational to Bonhoeffer’s theology, allowing only for an 
indirect application to nature, Chapter 3 dealt more directly with nature itself, or more 
specifically, with a cluster of concepts derived from Bonhoeffer’s theology of nature. I treated 
five such concepts in all. The first was that of Christ as the hidden center of nature 
(specifically after the Fall). I brought this unique concept to bear in the context of 
environmental ethics by taking it as a way to overcome the Cartesian divide between subject 
and object, which separates human beings both from each other and from nature, helped 
facilitate the radical instrumentalisation of nature, and which is clearly one of the root causes 
of the current ecological crisis. Secondly, I focussed on Bonhoeffer’s conception of the Fall, 
showing how he paints post-lapsarian nature in particularly dark colours. While I argued that 
his description of the world after the Fall is, in fact, somewhat too dark, I also made the case 
that the emphasis he gives to nature’s fallenness can help call into question the comparatively 
uncritical appraisal of nature made by so often by contemporary ecologists.  
 
Thirdly, I addressed Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on Christ as the Redeemer of nature in 
connection with his theology of the sacraments––or more specifically, in connection with his 
assertion that the sacraments give shape to a sort of preview, as it were, of the coming 
redemption of nature. I correlated this view with the increasing attention granted to the 
Christian sacraments in environmental ethics, indicating how Bonhoeffer’s (essentially 
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Lutheran) assertion of Christ’s real presence in the sacraments can function as a powerful 
motive for caring for creation. In addition, I argued that Bonhoeffer’s concept fulfills a 
critical function as well: by limiting the sacraments to baptism and Eucharist, he helps resist 
the universal sacramentalism which––while popular in ecotheology––tends to affirm the 
status quo, and, as a consequence, makes it rather difficult to call unjust social structures into 
question. Fourthly and finally, I transposed Bonhoeffer’s concept of the Erhaltungsordnungen 
into the domain of environmental ethics. In particular, I showed how he developed this 
concept as a critical alternative to the concept of the orders of creation espoused by many of 
German Christians––though Bonhoeffer affirms the existence of order, he also stresses that 
this order comes from above, that is, from God, instead of from below. In correlating this 
concept with the debate over the natural order in environmental ethics, I argued that it allows 
for the recognition of a certain order in the natural world, while also helping to criticize a 
hasty acceptance or romantization of nature––indeed, I showed how Bonhoeffer insisted quite 
emphatically that any order perceived in nature should be seen and understood in relation to 
Christ, and to him alone.   
 
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I focused on another general theme of Bonhoeffer’s work, 
namely, on the relationship of human beings amongst themselves, and between human beings 
and non-human nature. Chapters 4 and 5 correlated four important themes of his theological 
anthropology with current debates in environmental ethics. In Chapter 4, firstly, I began by 
addressing the first two of these themes: on the one hand, humanity’s fundamental 
relationship with, or rootedness within, nature, and, on the other hand, its qualitative 
distinction from nature. Regarding the first theme, I showed how, throughout Bonhoeffer’s 
work, he asserts the fundamental bodiliness of human existence. I indicated in particular how 
his emphasis on humanity’s bond with the earth was influenced by the movement of 
Lebensphilosophie, but at the same time, I also showed how his focus on this bond differs 
from the latter insofar as it is both explicitly theological and directly grounded in Scripture. 
From here, I drew attention to how the appreciation of human bodiliness plays an important 
role in environmental ethics as well: in many different ways, humanity’s attachment to other-
than-human life is seen as imperative in the effort to overcome the perceived estrangement of 
human beings from nature. In transposing Bonhoeffer’s train of thought into this debate, I 
argued that the significance of the particular way in which elaborates on mankind’s 
connection to the earth lies in the specifically biblical and theological reasoning behind it. I 
then closed by arguing that this can further the acceptance of human bodiliness among 
Christians, and that this, in turn, can serve as an additional motivation for environmental 
discipleship.  
 
The second concept that I treated in Chapter 4 was that of human distinctiveness. As I 
showed, even while Bonhoeffer stresses the fundamental bond between human beings and the 
earth, he also strongly asserts certain fundamental differences between human beings and 
non-human nature (or more specifically, animals). Throughout his work, he identifies a 
number of these differences. The most important of these can be seen in the strong emphasis 
that he places on human sociality––human beings, as he contends, are free for each other in 
ways that are purely and simply unavailable to other animals. On a more critical note, I 
referred to certain avenues of research showing how these distinctions are, in many important 
respects, theoretically inadequate––in particular, his understanding of human sociality as 
unique has been disproven, as have most of the other distinctions that he draws between 
human and non-human species. At the same time, I also argued that this in no way 
disqualifies the distinctions that Bonhoeffer sets up; if anything, they simply need to be 
reinterpreted in light of recent and ongoing ethological research. Regarding the theme of 
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sociality, for example, I drew from research which shows that, while non-human species do 
indeed engage in certain forms of social relations and modes of behaviour with each other, 
this sociality is far less developed—in degree—than that found in human beings. I then 
attempted to bring Bonhoeffer’s account of human distinctiveness to bear on environmental 
ethics. Since anthropocentrism, which is inherent in Bonhoeffer’s theology, has come under 
sustained criticism by environmental ethicists, I first of all defended the plausibility (as well 
as the viability) of an anthropocentric approach to nature, arguing that any thoroughgoing 
ecocentric alternative is not only philosophically unviable, but that it fails to motivate 
meaningful forms of environmental action and engagement. In this light, I made the case that 
an adjusted (or ‘weak’) form of anthropocentrism is not only possible, but necessary. This 
paved the way for me to draw out the particular contribution that Bonhoeffer’s theological 
anthropology is able to make in current debates. As I argued, his stress on sociality as 
something distinctly human can help to refocus attention on the social dimension of the 
ecological crisis––that is, on the closely intertwined relation between social and 
environmental problems.  
 
In Chapter 5, I correlated two other themes from Bonhoeffer’s theological 
anthropology with environmental ethics: the theme of human mastery, on the one hand, and 
of loyalty to the earth, on the other. Firstly, in my account for Bonhoeffer’s assertion that 
human beings are to rule over the non-human world, I argued that the way in which he 
effectively works this idea out is a far cry from an appeal for the ruthless exploitation of 
nature. Indeed, as I showed, he views humanity’s excessive reliance on technology as a patent 
failure to rule the earth. I also showed how, while his early theology seems to be satisfied 
with a pure and simple condemnation of technology, in his later thought, he arrives at the 
more mature view of technology as an intrinsic (and inescapable) part of the world come of 
age. In this light, he argues that, instead of fighting against the inevitable, the current state of 
affairs should be accepted—provided that an appropriate, anthropocentric ethic come to 
govern technology’s use and continued development. From here, I brought Bonhoeffer’s 
thought into correlation with debates in environmental ethics concerning human mastery and 
technology. Firstly, I argued that the ancient idea of the dominium terrae, in spite of the many 
contentions surrounding it, doesn’t need to be disqualified in light of the ecological crisis; on 
the contrary, it is a thoroughly adequate concept when viewed in light of nature’s 
ambivalence. In the same view, I argued that Bonhoeffer’s specific elaboration of this concept 
of mastery can help contribute to environmental ethics. Specifically, I made the case that his 
particular view of human mastery (which, as we recall, should only be exercised in 
recognition of God and of other human beings) can help to call the dominant Enlightenment 
paradigm (which effectively transforms the individual into a master of the universe) into 
question. Secondly, I argued that the maturation of Bonhoeffer’s views with respect 
technology can help redirect environmental ethics away from a fruitless (and insufficiently 
nuanced) condemnation of technology towards a more constructive engagement with the 
latter. 
 
The second theme that I treated in Chapter 5 was Bonhoeffer’s imperative of 
remaining loyal to the earth. As I showed, the urge to love the earth was a defining feature of 
Bonhoeffer’s entire theology, an appeal that gradually developed and matured throughout his 
theological development. We saw in particular how, over the course of time, he gradually 
shed some of the weight of the Lebensphilosophie that had first informed his love and, in the 
latter’s place, sought out a more robust Scriptural basis for his views. I then correlated his 
emphasis on human loyalty to the earth with similar appeals arising in contemporary ecology. 
I made the point that, whereas there is a striking similarity between these appeals, there is 
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also an important, overriding difference: whereas environmental ethicists often draw from 
sources such as earth spirituality and the experience of nature in order to make their case, and 
while these often contain valuable insights, from a Christian perspective, Bonhoeffer would 
undoubtedly warn against such tendencies seeking to divinise the earth. Indeed, as I argued, 
his imperative to remain loyal to the earth helps to draw attention to this danger and to 
formulate a genuinely Christian alternative in its place.  
 
In Chapter 6, I shifted from Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology and focussed on 
two other concepts falling under the general theme of the relationship between human beings 
and nature: responsibility and, closely related with the latter, the divine mandates. Concerning 
responsibility, I made the decision to focus exclusively on a single concept from Bonhoeffer’s 
broader matrix of responsibility, namely, that of vicarious, representative action. My account 
of the development of this concept throughout the course of Bonhoeffer’s corpus revealed just 
how fundamental a role it plays in the whole of his theology, being anchored at it is in the 
vicarious representation of Christ himself. While vicarious representation is primarily a 
concept concerning the relationships between human beings, Bonhoeffer makes clear that it 
can apply to things and states of affairs as well––though only in the form of being responsible 
for, and not being responsible to. Correlated with environmental ethics, I argued that viewing 
responsibility in terms of vicarious representation can offer a robust alternative to the popular 
conception of responsibility for future generations, which is fraught with philosophical 
difficulties. As I showed, Bonhoeffer’s concept avoids these problems by focussing on the 
idea that suffering people, living here in the present, already furnish us with sufficient 
motivation for taking responsibility on their behalf. And since a large part of this suffering is 
caused by ecological degradation, it thereby becomes important to address this dimension of 
suffering (and responsibility) as well. An additional reason for this is the fact that, from the 
perspective of Bonhoeffer’s conception of vicarious representation, it is possible to assign 
responsibility for nature and the environment to human beings.  
 
Secondly, in Chapter 6, I treated Bonhoeffer’s concept of the divine mandates (viz., of 
marriage, work, state, and church), which he originally intended to serve as a blueprint for a 
new, post-war society. As I showed, this concept can be viewed as a further development of 
Luther’s doctrine of the three Stände. Though Bonhoeffer developed the concept against the 
backdrop of modernity, we saw how it was still quite traditional in nature, reflecting 
relatively old-fashioned Prussian ideals. In spite of this apparent drawback, I argued that the 
concept nevertheless bears a great deal of contemporary relevance for environmental ethics. 
First of all, I showed how Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the mandates as forms of God’s 
commandments means that they function as a form of revelation––as such, they can help 
unmask unjust structures in society. While in his own time, Bonhoeffer used the concept as a 
tool to criticize a state that had become insatiably drunk with power, by shifting focus to the 
current context, I showed how it can also help to unmask the overwhelming dominance of the 
mandate of work which, through the doctrines of neoliberalism, has come to threaten and 
undermine the other three mandates. In this regard, I drew attention to the presence of a 
certain self-restraint at work within the mandate of work itself. As I argued, the best way 
forward is to embrace and strengthen the work mandate insofar as Bonhoeffer understood it, 
instead of simply condemning neoliberalism as a whole. Secondly, I asserted that, in order for 
Bonhoeffer’s concept to remain relevant in today’s context, the mandates would first need to 
be reformulated as global activities, or in other words, as a foundation for the establishment 
of global structures of accountability. This pertains specifically to the mandate of the state 
insofar as a globalized economy demands a measure of global, democratically mediated 
control. Thirdly and finally, I argued that Bonhoeffer’s mandates can help grant a new 
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impetus to the church to act as a community both in creating and sustaining networks of social 
interrelatedness, and in caring for nature. 
 
7.2 The Relevance of this Research Project for Environmental Ethics 
 
Having reviewed the major results of the project, I would now like to indicate what 
Bonhoeffer’s concepts, when taken together as a whole, can contribute to the field of 
environmental ethics. This should allow us to organize each of the concepts according to a 
scale of priority, or of immediate practical significance, at least insofar as current ecological 
problems and dilemmas are concerned.  
 
As I indicated in Chapter 1, the field of environmental ethics is remarkably wide and 
diverse. Keeping this in mind, the strategy that I have adopted has not been to develop an 
overarching perspective on the field as a whole, but rather to correlate certain concepts from 
Bonhoeffer’s theology with a limited number of ecological debates and issues. At the same 
time, I also expressed the expectation that, rather than merely offering a loose collection of 
unrelated contributions, a more integrated approach could be developed on the basis of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology. Taking a look back at the ground that we have covered, it is now 
possible to conclude that this goal has indeed been achieved––the correlations summarized 
above stand in a clear relationship to each other, and while I am not prepared, on the basis of 
his theology, to advance a wholesale ‘Bonhoefferian’ approach to environmental ethics, I 
would argue that his theology can contribute in significant ways to key debates within 
ecology. In total, this contribution can be formulated along the lines of the following four 
general tasks: 1) generating motivation for environmental action and engagement, as well as 
forming a more ecologically sensitive attitude towards nature; 2) formulating an ecologically 
viable Christian theology of nature; 3) revising Christian theological anthropology in light of 
the ecological crisis, and; 4) reflecting on the relationship between sociality and ecology.  
 
First of all, Bonhoeffer’s theology can function as a valuable resource for the 
development of arguments capable of motivating people to take better care of nature. In 
Chapter 2, I made clear how Bonhoeffer’s concept of Christuswirklichkeit can be used to urge 
Christians to take part more actively in the concerns of the world––instead of shying away 
from taking responsibility for the earth, it compels them to work towards the ‘good’ (defined 
as the reality of God made manifest in Christ) by conforming to Christ’s threefold 
relationship to the world. This concept is undoubtedly the most important contribution that 
Bonhoeffer’s theology can make in the context of ecology, for it links up directly with one of 
the most central issues in environmental ethics––namely, the problem of motivating people to 
abandon their environmentally destructive and careless behaviour and to care of the 
environment. I addressed this issue in Chapter 4 when I referred to Roger Scruton’s 
observation of the need for a widely accessible argument explaining why people need to be 
concerned about the environment. Bonhoeffer’s concept delivers such an argument. Though it 
is specifically addressed to Christians, it also sets Christian men and women free to engage 
wholeheartedly in the efforts of non-Christians to curb ecological destruction. Moreover, it 
never places them under the illusion that they themselves are responsible for the realization of 
God’s Kingdom on earth––on the contrary, it clearly reveals that their task is, much more 
modestly, a mere preparation of the way for God’s coming Kingdom.  
 
Secondly, Bonhoeffer’s theology contributes towards the development of an 
ecologically relevant theology of nature. In Chapter 3, I argued that Bonhoeffer offers a 
surprisingly rich theology of nature, even in spite of its relatively underdeveloped state. One 
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point that is especially valuable in this regard is his thinking on Christ as the center of nature. 
This is a centrality that, as we saw, remains hidden, and which only manifests itself in the 
sacraments, thereby offering a preview of nature’s future redemption. This specific proposal 
for a cosmic Christology contains great promise for the formulation of a Christian theology of 
nature. In order to put the concept in context, I made the point that Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on 
the cosmic scope of Christ’s lordship in no way leads him to minimize—let alone deny—the 
importance of the historical Jesus; on the contrary, I showed how his Christology remains 
firmly committed to the Christian creeds. Given this groundedness in the creeds, I then 
argued that his cosmic Christology offers a viable alternative to, for example, the thoughts of 
Teilhard de Chardin, which are much more speculative and disengaged from the historical 
Jesus. Also, in Teilhard’s account, ‘sin’ doesn’t have nearly the same degree of prominence 
as it does for Bonhoeffer. In short, Bonhoeffer’s cosmic Christology is considerably more 
‘thick’ in that it is able both to accommodate nature’s fallenness and, at the same time, to 
recognize nature as already redeemed in Christ (even if this redemption still has yet to fully 
manifest itself). This ‘thickness’ is also clearly discernable in Bonhoeffer’s conception of the 
Erhaltungsordnungen. As I showed, his assertion, that the order perceived in nature should 
always be seen in relation to Christ, opens up a middle way between an uncritical acceptance 
of nature ‘as it is’, on the one hand, and a singular condemnation of every form of natural 
theology, on the other hand. In this way, Christ, by his threefold relationship to the world, 
becomes the criterion for deciding whether something is ‘natural’ or not. In other words, 
nature is not purely and simply given, with Christ coming on the scene after the fact; no, for 
Bonhoeffer, nature is only fully revealed as nature in and through Christ alone. In the context 
of environmental ethics, it should also be noted that Bonhoeffer’s theology of nature 
functions as a necessary complement to his understanding of Christuswirklichkeit (as well as 
related concepts), which I described in Chapter 2, for it further develops an argument for 
people––specifically Christians––to care for nature.   
 
The third general contribution to environmental ethics lies in Bonhoeffer’s theological 
anthropology. In particular, I applied four elements of his anthropology to discussions bearing 
on the relationship between human beings and nature. As I showed, Bonhoeffer surprisingly 
refashioned certain elements from the philosophical and theological anthropologies of other 
thinkers and traditions. We saw, for example, how he adopts the general philosophical notion 
of Leiblichkeit, only then to ground it in relation to Scripture. We also saw how he redefined 
the concept of the imago Dei in terms of an analogia relationis. After drawing attention to 
these renovated conceptual tools, I argued on behalf of the relevance of Bonhoeffer’s 
theological anthropology with regard to ongoing debates in environmental ethics—for 
example, the debate concerning the appropriation of technology. At the same time, I also 
noted how the contributions that Bonhoeffer’s thought is actually able to make are 
considerably weaker, or less significant, than those outlined in chapters 2 and 3. Regarding 
the theme of human distinctiveness, for example, we saw how none of the distinctions that 
Bonhoeffer drew between human beings and animals has stood the test of contemporary 
scientific inquiry. While I argued that it is important not to lose sight of human 
distinctiveness relative to animal life, Bonhoeffer’s theology undoubtedly falls short here, for 
the only distinctions that we were able to keep were quantitative in nature, and not qualitative, 
as Bonhoeffer had argued. As significant and important as his anthropology is, then, its 
contribution in the context of environmental ethics is relatively limited. 
 
Fourthly and finally, I made the case that Bonhoeffer’s theology can also contribute 
towards the development of a specifically Christian framework for taking responsibility, both 
in relation to nature and to society. As I showed, his concept of Stellvertretung is valuable in 
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the way that it stresses the qualitative uniqueness of Christ’s vicarious representation, through 
which human beings are reconciled to God, while at the same time using it as a paradigm for 
authentic Christian living. This undoubtedly issues a radical call for taking responsibility both 
for society and for an endangered planet. In particular, it is able to provide a much needed 
alternative, or median path, between liberalism’s dual-focus on the (moral) example of Jesus 
and social justice, and orthodoxy’s focus on Christ’s uniqueness and on individual salvation 
(though, to be fair, this presentation of either position is admittedly somewhat of a caricature). 
In addition, we saw how Bonhoeffer’s conception of the divine mandates can be viewed as a 
concretisation of the way Christians can live out their lives responsibly. In this connection, I 
indicated certain ways in which this concept can contribute towards environmental ethics—
for example, by emphasising that the mandates come from ‘above’ (as commandments of 
God), they help reveal unjust structures of power. Although Bonhoeffer’s theology of 
responsibility can certainly make important contributions to contemporary environmental 
ethics, they too are relatively modest in nature. One specific limitation can be found in the 
fact that Bonhoeffer does not deliberately include nature in the realm of human responsibility, 
even though he provides the conceptual possibility of doing so. In addition, his concept of the 
divine mandates presents a number of problems, as I pointed out. Very much like his 
theological anthropology, then, the value of Bonhoeffer’s theology of responsibility for 
current environmental ethics is relatively limited.  
 
In sum, this dissertation features two different categories of contributions. The first 
category consists of concepts (concerning the relationship between Christ and the (natural) 
world) that have the capacity to make the most significant contribution to environmental 
ethics. In contrast, the second category is composed of concepts (concerning Bonhoeffer’s 
theological anthropology and his theology of responsibility) that would appear to have much 
less to offer. Setting this relative distinction to the side, however, one could still easily argue 
that Bonhoeffer’s theology has a great deal to bring to bear on key debates within the field.  
 
7.3 Possibilities for Future Research 
 
This dissertation helps open up a number of perspectives for future research, three of which I 
would briefly like to consider here, in closing. 
 
First of all, I drew attention to the eschatological dimension of Bonhoeffer’s theology. 
While I pointed out (primarily in Chapter 2) that scholars have gradually come to 
acknowledge the presence of this dimension in his work, a thorough description of it has yet 
to be carried out. The partial exploration that I undertook in that chapter drew particular 
attention to the promise of Bonhoeffer’s eschatology insofar as it provides an alternative to 
both escapist and immanent alternatives. While, in the context of the dissertation, I focussed 
specifically on the potential significance of his eschatology for the field of ecology, it can 
readily be observed that it bears great promise for other contexts as well. Bonhoeffer’s own 
examples of feeding the hungry and healing the sick, as activities belonging to the realm of 
the penultimate, could clearly be brought to bear in the field of social ethics, political ethics, 
and the ethics of care, for example. For this reason, it is crucial that more in-depth study be 
carried out on this aspect of Bonhoeffer’s theology.  
 
Secondly, this dissertation has barely even scratched the surface of the potential 
contribution that Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology could make towards a renewed formulation of the 
church’s mission, particularly in the context of the ecological crisis. Although I briefly 
touched on the subject in Chapter 6, I only approached it in a very limited, formal way, that 
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is, in relation to the divine mandates; as such, I have significantly restricted the present study 
from considering the full contribution that Bonhoeffer could make in this regard. A more 
thoroughgoing examination of Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology would very likely result in a much 
richer understanding of his potential contribution to environmental ethics, as well as to other 
contexts.  
 
Thirdly, an important issue for further research concerns the relation between the 
theology of nature and the doctrine of Christ. This challenge was addressed in Chapter 3, 
where I argued that Bonhoeffer’s way of understanding Christ as the hidden center of nature 
helps to answer the question of how to overcome the subject/object divide within nature. 
However, there are many other possible contributions that could be drawn out from a more 
sustained reformulation of the theology of nature within the context of Christology, and not 
simply for the field of environmental ethics. To do so would necessitate going beyond 
Bonhoeffer, however, for his work only addresses the issue in a tentative fashion. One point 
that would be particularly important to address would be the question of how we ought to 
appropriate—Christologically—the understanding of nature made available through the 
natural sciences.  
